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In this paper we explore the application of methods for classical judgment aggregation in pooling
probabilistic opinions on logically related issues. For this reason, we first modify the Boolean judg-
ment aggregation framework in the way that allows handling probabilistic judgments and then define
probabilistic aggregation functions obtained by generalization of the classical ones. In addition, we
discuss essential desirable properties for the aggregation functions and explore impossibility results.
1 Introduction
Judgment aggregation (JA) is concerned with aggregating sets of binary truth valuations assigned to log-
ically related issues [27, 19]. Various collective decision making problems in artificial intelligence can
be modelled as JA problems, e.g., problems of constructing agreements, such as finding a collective goal
in multi-agent systems [36, 2]. In agreement reaching problems each agent in a group is a source of
judgments and also typically affected by the collective choice resulting from the aggregation of individ-
ual judgments. For example, I am a citizen voting on a referendum that decided not to impose global
warming curbing methods, but I am also a citizen that has to live with the consequences of that collec-
tive decision. A typical JA example [27] is one concerning three issues: Current CO2 emissions lead
to global warming (p), If current CO2 emissions lead to global warming, then we should reduce CO2
emissions (p→ q), We should reduce CO2 emissions (q). The individual sets of judgments are as in
Table 1. As observed from the example, pooling the truth valuations on each issue does not always lead
to a consistent set of collective judgments. JA designs and studies aggregators that produce a consistent
outcome.
However, aggregation problems are not always Boolean, because the individual judgments on whether
an issue is true or false are not always certain. We give an example.
Example 1.1. You want a recommendation for a specific hotel, “The Grand Palace”, however, you want
that recommendation to be compiled specifically for you. You are interested in:
• a hotel close to the centre or well connected with public transport (s∨ t);
• a hotel that is a unique experience (x),
• a hotel that is a good value for money (a).
p p→ q q
Minister 1 true true true
Minister 2 true false false
Minister 3 false true false
Majority true true false
Table 1: An example of a judgment aggregation.
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The information that you can get from online information sources (IS), like booking.com, TripAdvisor,
etc., can be processed automatically, by pooling reviews from recommendations regarding “The Grand
Palace” hotel. An example of such collection of opinions is given in Table 2. What we obtain from each
IS is the likelihood that an issue is true. You can find information online about s∨ t (second column),
about whether “The Grand Palace” hotel is a unique experience (third column) and also whether the
hotel is recommended by the users, h, (fourth column). However, it is not enough that the hotel is
recommended in the reviews. For you, a hotel should be recommended (h) iff both s∨ t and a are true,
i.e. ((s∨ t)∧a)↔ h. Information about a may not be available to extract. Assume that you define that
a hotel is a good value for money (a) if it is not more than 80 Euro per night (¬e) or if it is a unique
experience, i.e., when (¬e∨x)↔ a holds. Then the information you need to extract is whether ¬e is true.
This is given in the sixth column of Table 2.
s∨ t x h a ¬e
IS 1 0.6 1 1 - 1
IS 2 0.7 0.6 0.5 - 1
IS 3 0.1 0.4 0.2 - 1
IS 4 0.8 0.8 0.9 - 1
IS 5 0.7 0.7 0.4 - 1
IS 6 0.5 0.6 0.3 - 1
Table 2: An example of a source aggregation.
We want to be able to aggregate likelihood judgments like the ones represented in the rows of Table 2,
but into a set of Boolean judgments: should the hotel be recommended and for which reasons. To achieve
this purpose, we explore how methods from classical judgment aggregation can be adjusted to deal with
probabilistic statements as judgments. Thus, we extend the propositional logic JA framework typically
used [27, 19, 26, 14] using the logic of likelihood [20], and design probabilistic aggregation functions
based on the classical ones. Thus, intuitively, what were desirable properties for aggregation in the
classical case, remain desirable properties in the probabilistic framework.
Our framework allows sources to have uncertain probabilistic judgments that are rational and sub-
ject to inevitable probabilistic constraints, but also to aggregate into a collective judgment set that is
Boolean and subject to a specific set of propositional constraints. Frameworks for representing non-
binary judgments have been considered, see e.g., [19] for an overview, however no specific methods for
aggregation have been designed for these frameworks. Rather, impossibility characterisations have been
studied showing which sets of desirable properties cannot be mutually satisfied. Here we propose specific
classes of aggregators for the framework we introduce.
There is a certain amount of literature on probabilistic opinion pooling (e.g., see [28] for a detailed
survey) which is concerned with aggregating probability functions (representing opinions of agents) into
a single one. The defined properties of the aggregating functions are similar to those in JA theory, and
similarly as there, impossibility results are proved. However, opinion pooling presumes that every agent
has its probabilistic judgments defined on a σ -algebra of events (or, equivalently on a set of possible
worlds). Despite the inherent consistency, this is not always a realistic requirement. In our frame-
work, we allow the agents to express their probabilistic opinions on any (logically related) propositional
language statements (equivalently, on any subset of a σ -algebra of events), and, moreover, these opin-
ions can be imprecise, i.e., expressed through likelihood inequalities (equivalently, a set of probability
functions is provided by each source.) In this sense our work is more comparable to variants of opin-
ion pooling that presume a general agenda [7] or deal with imprecise probabilities [37]. Aggregation
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functions in probabilistic opinion pooling are typically averaging functions like (weighted) linear or geo-
metrical average. Here we take the approach of defining aggregation functions by generalizing judgment
aggregation functions based on representative voting.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the judgment aggregation framework
based on the logic of likelihood. In Section 3 we demonstrate how to generalise classical judgment
aggregation functions into functions that handle likelihood judgments, and we also introduce some new
classes of judgment aggregation functions. In Section 4 we discuss desirable properties of aggregation
functions and revisit the classical impossibility results. In Section 5 we discuss related work and in
Section 6 we make our conclusions and outline directions for future work.
2 Framework
We distinguish between an agenda setter and information sources. The agenda setter identifies the set
of issues, i.e., the agenda for which Boolean judgments need to be made. The agenda setter can also set
additional relations, which we call propositional constraints, that should hold among the agenda issues.
The information sources are modelled as sets of likelihood formulas subject to different relations called
probabilistic constraints. The probabilistic constraints model the natural and contextual properties of the
issues.
2.1 Judgment aggregation model
To model the agenda and the propositional constraints we use a set L of propositional logic formulas.
An agenda is a finite set Φ ⊂ L ,
Φ= {ϕ1, . . . ,ϕm} , (1)
s.t. ϕi is neither a tautology nor a contradiction. We call the elements of the agenda issues. The set of
propositional constraints Γ ⊂L represents special relations that should hold among the agenda issues
described by the agenda setter. Γ should be satisfiable, and we allow Γ= {>}. In Example 1.1, we have
Φ= {s∨ t,h,x,e,a}, and Γ= {(¬e∨ x)↔ a,((s∨ t)∧a)↔ h}.
The agenda setter is interested in aggregating collections of judgments on the agenda issues from
various information sources into a set of crisp (Boolean) judgments that is consistent with Γ. A crisp
judgment on ϕ ∈ Φ is either ϕ or ¬ϕ . A crisp judgment set J is a set of crisp judgments. E.g., the
judgments of Minister 2 in Table1 can be represented as a crisp judgment set J2 = {p,¬(p→ q),¬q}.
We introduce the notation Φ∪ = Φ∪{¬ϕ | ϕ ∈ Φ}. Then a crisp judgment set J is a subset of Φ∪. The
set J is consistent if J∪Γ is a consistent set of formulas in classical propositional logic. J is complete if it
contains one crisp judgment for each of the issues in the agenda. If the crisp judgment set J is consistent
and complete, we say that it is rational. Given an agenda Φ and propositional constraints Γ, the set of all
consistent and complete, i.e., rational crisp judgment sets isJ .
We model the information sources as sets of likelihood judgments on Φ∪. A likelihood judgment on
the issue ϕ ∈Φ∪ is a simple likelihood formula of the type:
`(ϕ)≥∗ a , (2)
where ≥∗∈ {≥,=} and a ∈ [0,1].1
1The formula (2) is an instance of the logic of likelihood in [18], [20] that consists of Boolean combinations of linear
likelihood formulas of the type a1`(ϕ1)+ . . .+an`(ϕn)≥ b, where ai,b are real numbers, and ϕi are pure propositional formulas.
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The likelihood judgment `(ϕ)≥ a expresses that the likelihood (probability)2 of the statement ϕ be-
ing true is at least a. This intuition immediately implies that `(¬ϕ)≤ 1−a. This and other entailments
we mention later can formally be proved in the axiomatic system for the logic of likelihood that consists
of axioms for propositional reasoning, reasoning about inequalities, and the following axioms for prob-
abilistic reasoning given in [20]:
(L1) `(ϕ)≥ 0,
(L2) `(>) = 1,
(L3) `(ϕ) = `(ϕ ∧ψ)+ `(ϕ ∧¬ψ),
(L4) From ϕ ↔ ψ infer `(ϕ) = `(ψ).
Having `(¬ϕ)≤ 1−a gives us an upper, but not a lower bound for the likelihood of ¬ϕ . Therefore,
we ask that an explicit judgment for the likelihood of ¬ϕ is given.
`(ϕ) = a is a stronger statement than `(ϕ) ≥ a expressing that the likelihood of ϕ being true is
exactly a. In this case, a judgment for ¬ϕ is implied, namely, `(¬ϕ) = 1−a.
Each of the information sources is represented as a set of likelihood judgments Jˆ. The set Jˆ has one
likelihood judgment on each of the issues in Φ∪:
Jˆ ={`(ϕ)≥∗ aϕ | ϕ ∈Φ∪} , (3)
where ≥∗∈ {=,≥}, aϕ ∈ [0,1].
Note that providing likelihood formulas for both ϕ and ¬ϕ in Eq.(3) is equivalent with providing
intervals for the likelihood of either ϕ or ¬ϕ (hence the information sources are free to do that) but for
the discussion in this paper the formulation in Eq.(3) is a more suitable one.
A set of likelihood judgments is always complete in the sense that it contains a likelihood judgment
for each of the issues. This assumption does not limit the freedom of not having a specific likelihood
estimate for a given issue ϕ . To represent the absence of a specific likelihood, or an “abstention” on an
issue ϕ we use the tautology `(ϕ)≥ 0. We usually omit explicitly writing these type of formulas in the
examples of judgment sets. Also, if we have `(ϕ) = a ∈ Jˆ, we can omit including `(¬ϕ) = 1−a as an
element of Jˆ.
Given a finite set of n information sources N = {1, . . . ,n}, a likelihood profile:
Pˆ = (Jˆ1, . . . , Jˆn) , (4)
is a collection of sets of likelihood judgments for an agenda Φ, each representing one information source
k ∈ N. We slightly abuse notation and write Jˆk ∈ Pˆ to denote that Jˆk is the k-th likelihood judgment set
in Pˆ:
Jˆk = {`(ϕ)≥∗ akϕ | ϕ ∈Φ∪} , (5)
where akϕ ∈ [0,1], for k = 1, . . . ,n. The profile set of likelihood judgments that will be obtained from the
information in Example 1.1 is given in Table 3.
We require that the sets of likelihood judgments in the profile are rational. We now define what are
rational likelihood judgments.
Likelihood formulas are interpreted in probability spaces where the term `(ϕ) is interpreted as the probability of the set of
worlds (outcomes) at which ϕ is true.
2 In this paper we interpret likelihood as probability and we use the two terms interchangeably. Note that, however, likeli-
hood can also be interpreted as other measure of belief, see [20].
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Table 3: A profile of likelihood judgments for the hotel recommendation example.
2.2 Rationality of probabilistic judgment sets
A probabilistic judgment set is consistent if it is a consistent set of formulas in the logic of likelihood
(according to the canonical definition of consistency). Note that a probabilistic judgment set is not
always consistent. Consider, for example, the agenda Φ = {p1, p1 ∧ p2, p1 ∧¬p2} and Jˆ = {`(p1) =
0.5, `(p1∧ p2)≥ 0.4, `(p1∧¬p2)≥ 0.7}. The set Jˆ is an inconsistent set of formulas, because it implies
`(p1)≥ 1.1 by the axiom (L3) of likelihood logic. Furthermore, note that a judgment set Jˆ defined as in
(3) has to satisfy aϕ +a¬ϕ ≤ 1, for every ϕ ∈Φ, in order to be consistent.
In the probabilistic case, consistency and completeness are not enough of conditions for rationality.
For example, Jˆ = {`(p1) ≥ 0.3, `(p1 ∧ p2) ≥ 0.4, `(p1 ∧¬p2) ≥ 0.1} is a consistent set. However, the
second formula in it implies that `(p1) ≥ 0.4, which is stronger than the existing `(p1) ≥ 0.3 and, as
such, is a more valuable judgment. We can formalize the notion of a stronger judgment as follows: if
`(ϕ) ≥∗ a implies `(ϕ) ≥∗ b we will say that `(ϕ) ≥∗ a is a stronger judgment than `(ϕ) ≥∗ b. For
example, `(ϕ) = a implies `(ϕ) ≥ a. To ensure that we always have the strongest possible judgments
in the consistent judgment sets, we introduce the notion of a final judgment. A consistent probabilistic
judgment set is final if it does not imply stronger judgments than the ones it contains.3
Probabilistic judgments can be subject to probabilistic constraints Γˆ, where Γˆ is a set of likelihood
formulas to denote that certain combinations of issues must have a certain likelihood. For example for
agenda Φ = {p1, p2, p3}, where p1, p2, and p3 represent the three possible states of a random variable,
we can have the integrity constraint `(p1) + `(p2) + `(p3) = 1. Unlike the constraints Γ which are
given by the agenda setter, the probabilistic constraints Γˆ describe facts of the world and we assume
that all information sources produce probabilistic judgment sets that are consistent with the probabilistic
constraints.
A probabilistic judgment set Jˆ is rational if it is complete and final, and Jˆ ∪ Γˆ is a consistent set of
likelihood formulas. Given an agenda Φ and probabilistic constraints Γˆ, the set of all rational likelihood
judgment sets is denoted by Jˆ . A profile is rational if all the judgment sets in it are rational.
We call a probabilistic aggregation frame the tuple (Φ,N,Γ, Γˆ), where Φ is an agenda, N is a set
of information sources, Γˆ is probabilistic constraints to be satisfied by the individual judgments of the
sources, and Γ are propositional constraints to be satisfied by the collective judgment. We call a crisp ag-
gregation frame the tuple (Φ,N,Γ), but now Γ are constraints to be satisfied by the individual judgments
as well.
3We recognize that it some cases it can be hard to check if a judgment set is final or not. In that sense, we note that this
property of the judgment sets would not inflict the application of the judgment aggregation methods defined below, but it would
influence the relevance of the produced results and the quality of the decision.
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3 Aggregating likelihood judgments
We distinguish between crispifying aggregators and direct aggregators. Crispifying aggregators first
aggregate the likelihood profile into likelihood judgment set(s) and then use given threshold values to
“crispify” these sets. Direct aggregators assign a crisp judgment set (or sets) to a likelihood profile
directly.
The rest of this section is organized as follows: We first consider details of the “crispification step”
and introduce the formal definition of an aggregator; in Section 3.2 we propose a way to compare the
likelihood aggregators with the classical ones; and finally in Section 3.3 and Section 3.4 we introduce
several likelihood aggregators and analyse connections with the corresponding classical ones.
3.1 Crispifying
Given a probabilistic judgment, we can obtain a crisp judgment by choosing a threshold coefficient
c ∈ [0,1]. This coefficient can be by default set to 0.5 for each issue, but otherwise we assume that it is
specified by the agenda setter, in response to the question: How likely should an issue be in the least in
order to be accepted as true? We define the judgment crispifying function crisp() as follows:
crisp(`(ϕ)≥∗ a,c) =
{ {ϕ}, if a≥ c
/0, otherwise
(6)
According to the above definition, if a likelihood judgment on a statement ϕ ∈ Φ∪ has a (minimal)
likelihood strictly greater than or equal to c, we assign it a Boolean judgment ϕ . Otherwise, no Boolean
judgment is assigned for this issue. If we decide to be strict on an issue ϕ and accept it only if true, we
set cϕ = 1.
We can crispify a probabilistic judgment set Jˆ by crispifying each of its judgments. We distinguish
between issue-wise crispifying when a different coefficient is assigned for every agenda issue and uniform
crispifying when the same coefficient is used for every agenda issue.
Let c = (cϕ)ϕ∈Φ∪ be a vector of coefficients, where each cϕ ∈ [0,1], and cϕ + c¬ϕ > 1. We call this
a vector of crispifying coefficients. A judgment set crispifying is defined as follows:
crisp(Jˆ,c) =
⋃
{crisp(`(ϕ)≥∗ aϕ ,cϕ) | `(ϕ)≥∗ aϕ ∈ Jˆ} (7)
The condition cϕ+c¬ϕ > 1, along with the consistency requirements aϕ+a¬ϕ ≤ 1, assures that only
one element of the set {ϕ,¬ϕ} is in crisp(Jˆ,c) for each ϕ ∈ Φ. If cϕ = c, for every ϕ ∈ Φ∪, and some
c ∈ (1/2,1], the crispifying defined by Eq.(7) is uniform, and we denote it by crisp(Jˆ,c). Note that the
constraint c> 1/2 follows from the consistency requirement on the crispifying vector.
Observe that the obtained crisp set of judgments may be incomplete. Further, we allow the agenda
setter to freely choose whichever coefficients she wants for any of the issues, depending on the given
context. This freedom of choice is done here for simplicity. We can, however, argue that a freely chosen
vector of crispifying coefficients may be seen as imposing a certain level of independence on the issues.
We can argue that if for two issues ϕ1,ϕ2 ∈ Φ when it holds that {ϕ1 → ϕ2} ∈ Γ, then it should not
be allowed that c1 < c2, i.e., in this case we would need the additional constraint c1 ≥ c2. Also, if
ϕ1 ↔ ϕ2 ∈ Γ, we would need to have c1 = c2, i.e., logically equivalent issues should have the same
likelihood threshold requirement. Restricting the values in c with respect to Γ is an interesting aspect of
our framework and is a line of future work we intend to pursue.
We now give a formal definition for an aggregator.
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Definition 3.1. Let (Φ,N,Γ, Γˆ) be a probabilistic aggregation frame and let Pˆ be the set of all rational
likelihood profiles for it, while [0,1]2m, for m = |Φ|, is the set of all crispifying vectors c. Let fˆ be a
mapping from Pˆ to Jˆ . A crispifying judgment aggregation function Fˆ is a mapping from Pˆ× [0,1]2m
to P(J ), i.e. Fˆ(Pˆ,c) ⊆J , where Fˆ(Pˆ,c) = crisp( fˆ (Pˆ),c) is the classical judgment set obtained by
crispifying the likelihood judgment set fˆ (Pˆ). A direct judgment aggregation function F is a mapping
from Pˆ toP(J ), i.e. F(Pˆ)⊆J .
According to the above definition an aggregator is defined for every rational profile and always
produces rational judgment sets as a result, properties that are later introduced as universal domain and
rationality, correspondingly. We embed these properties in the definition since they are the most basic
desirable properties of the aggregation process, usually satisfied by design. However, while the universal
domain is satisfied by all the aggregators defined below, we sometimes deviate from Definition 3.1 by
defining some aggregators that are not rational.
Notice also that, even thought we insist on the collective judgment being crisp, in every crispify-
ing aggregator (and, implicitly, in many direct aggregators) an intermediate probabilistic aggregate is
available if needed in the decision process.
3.2 Classical vs probabilistic aggregators
Same as they do in [26], we define a classical irresolute aggregation function F¯(P) as one that maps each
crisp rational profile P of judgments to a nonempty set of crisp rational judgment sets.
Consider a crisp judgment set J ∈J . We define its corresponding probabilistic judgment set J∗ in
the following way:
J∗ = {`(ϕ) = 1, `(¬ϕ) = 0 | ϕ ∈ J} (8)
Note that crisp(J∗,c) = J for every vector of crispifying coefficients c = (cϕ)ϕ∈Φ∪ such that cϕ = 1, for
ϕ ∈ J.
Given a crisp profile P = (J1, . . . ,Jn) we define
P∗ = (J∗1 , . . . ,J
∗
n ),
to be its correspondent probabilistic profile. We can now define what it means for a likelihood aggregator
to generalize a crisp aggregator.
Definition 3.2. Let (Φ,N,Γ, Γˆ) be a probabilistic aggregation frame. Consider the corresponding crisp
frame (Φ,N,Γ) and let P be the set of all rational likelihood profiles for it. Let P∗ be a corresponding
profile for a P ∈ P. A direct likelihood aggregator F generalizes a crisp aggregator F¯ if F¯(P) = F(P∗)
for each P ∈ P. A crispifying likelihood aggregator Fˆ generalizes a crisp aggregator F¯ if there exists
c ∈ [0,1]2m such that F¯(P) = Fˆ(P∗,c) for each P ∈ P.
3.3 Crispifying aggregators
We now consider two classes of crispifying aggregators.
Uniform quota aggregators Quota aggregators assign a crisp judgment to elements inΦ∪ in two steps.
First, the collective likelihood of ϕ is assigned. The collective likelihood for ϕ is the maximal a ∈ [0,1]
such that the number of agents in the profile who assign a likelihood of at least a reaches a given quota
q. Second, the collective likelihood judgments are crispified using a crispifying coefficient. The formal
definition follows.
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Definition 3.3. Given a profile Pˆ, a crispifying vector c and a quota q ∈ N, 1 ≤ q ≤ n, we define the
uniform quota function fˆq:
fˆq(Pˆ) = {`(ϕ)≥∗ aϕ : aϕ = max0≤a≤1(|{k : akϕ ≥ a}| ≥ q)} .
Fˆq(Pˆ,c) = crisp( fˆq(Pˆ),c).
(9)
As an illustration, consider the example in Table 3. For a uniform c= (0.6, . . . ,0.6) and a quota q= 3
we obtain Fˆ3(Pˆ,0.6) = {s∨ t,x,¬h,¬e}, which is inconsistent with Γ.
If q = n, we obtain the unanimous function that selects as collective only those judgments ϕ who are
assigned a likelihood akϕ ≥ cϕ by all the agents k. For q = bn2c+1 we obtain the issue-by-issue majority
function, which we denote with M. Under issue-by-issue majority function the profile is aggregated by
selecting the judgments that are in the most (more than a half) of the judgment sets in the profile. The
set M(Pˆ,c) = Fˆb n2 c+1(Pˆ,c) is called a majoritarian set for Pˆ and c.
The majoritarian set of a crisp profile P is denoted m(P) and contains all the elements of Φ∪ that are
supported by a strict majority of the individual judgment sets:
m(P) = {ϕ : ϕ ∈Φ∪, |{k : ϕ ∈ Jk}|> n2} (10)
The following theorem can be easily proved:
Theorem 3.1. Let (Φ,N,Γ, Γˆ) be a probabilistic likelihood frame, and c = (cϕ)ϕ∈Φ∪ be a vector of
coefficients such that cϕ > 0, for every ϕ ∈ Φ∪. Then m(P) = M(P∗,c), where P∗ is the corresponding
probabilistic profile to the crisp profile P.
Aggregators based on the majoritarian set One way to aggregate probabilistic judgments into a
rational crisp judgment set is to minimally modify the set M(Pˆ,c) so that it becomes consistent with
Γ. This approach is used in crisp judgment aggregation to define several aggregators based on the
majoritarian set [26]. We can extend the definition of aggregators based on the majoritarian set to
likelihood aggregators as follows.
Definition 3.4. A crispifying likelihood aggregator Fˆ is based on the majoritarian set if for every Pˆ, Pˆ′ ∈
Pˆ it holds that Fˆ(Pˆ,c) = Fˆ(Pˆ′,c) if fˆq(Pˆ) = fˆq(Pˆ′), where q = bn2c+1 and n is the number of agents in
Pˆ and Pˆ′.
Since classical aggregators based on the majoritarian set use as an input not the entire profile but just
the set of majority judgments their definitions can be easily extended to handle profiles of probabilistic
judgments as well. Proposition 3.1 proves that the latter is not necessary.
First, recall the uniform quota rule for “classical” JA [19]. For profiles P = (J1, . . . ,Jn) of crisp
judgment sets, the crisp uniform quota function Uq is defined to give as output the set of those judgments
that are in at least q judgment sets in P:
Uq(P) = {ϕ : ϕ ∈Φ∪, |{k : ϕ ∈ Jk}| ≥ q} (11)
Let Pc = (crisp(Jˆ1,c), . . . ,crisp(Jˆn,c)) be the profile obtained by crispifying each probabilistic judg-
ment set in a Pˆ-profile Pˆ = (Jˆ1, . . . , Jˆn) by a vector c. We show that first calculating fˆq(Pˆ) and then
crispifying is the same as first crispifying each judgment sets in the profile into Pc and then applying Uq
to this Pc. Namely, we show that the quota function commutes with the crispifying function.
Proposition 3.1. For every Pˆ ∈ Pˆ, crispifying coefficients c, and quota q ≤ n it holds that Fˆq(Pˆ,c) =
Uq(Pc).
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Proof. We prove that ϕ ∈ Fˆq(Pˆ,c) iff ϕ ∈Uq(Pc). Consider ϕ ∈ Φ. The proof is similar for ¬ϕ ∈ Φ∪.
We have that ϕ ∈ Fˆq(Pˆ,c) iff there exists at least q agents k s.t. akϕ ≥ cϕ . This is the case iff there are at
least q agents k in Pc s.t. ϕ ∈ Jk. Thus necessarily ϕ ∈ fˆq(Pc) and we get ϕ ∈ Fˆq(Pˆ,c) iff ϕ ∈Uq(Pc).
Proposition 3.1 shows that we can use classical aggregators based on the majoritarian set to
aggregate likelihood judgments. We simply crispify the profile first and then apply the classical aggre-
gator. As a consequence, however, we can conclude that finding the collective judgments for probabilistic
profiles is as computationally hard as for crisp profiles when these aggregators are used. Complexity re-
sults for these aggregators are given in [24, 15].
Let us consider the weighted majoritarian aggregation rules defined in [26]. These rules, in addition
to using a (crisp) majoritarian set as input, also use the number N(P,ϕ) of agents that support each
judgment in that majoritarian set:
N(P,ϕ) = |{k : ϕ ∈Φ∪,ϕ ∈ Jk}| . (12)
In general, according to [26], a classical irresolute aggregation function F¯ is based on the weighted
majoritarian set if for every two JA-profiles P and P′, N(P,ϕ) = N(P′,ϕ) implies F¯(P) = F¯(P′), for
every ϕ ∈Φ∪.
An example of such an aggregator is the median rule of [26]. We give the definition of this aggregator
using our notation:
MED(P) = argmax
J∈J
∑
ϕ∈J
N(P,ϕ) , (13)
where N(P,ϕ) is defined as in Eq.(12).
Proposition 3.1 shows that the weighted majoritarian set can also be directly used to aggregate like-
lihood judgments. This can be done by generalizing the definition of N(P,ϕ).
Let us define Nˆ(Pˆ,ϕ,c) to be the number of agents that assign to ϕ a likelihood greater than or equal
to some c ∈ [0,1] in the profile Pˆ:
Nˆ(Pˆ,ϕ,c) = |{k : akϕ ≥ c}| . (14)
When each of the judgment sets in the profile Pˆ is crispified by a vector of coefficients c= (cϕ)ϕ∈Φ∪ ,
such that cϕ = c, then Nˆ(Pˆ,ϕ,c) is exactly N(P,ϕ) for the resulting crisp profile P.
However, we do not have to constrain ourselves with just using Nˆ(Pˆ,ϕ,c), we can further generalize
the weighted majoritarian rules of [26] to consider not only how many agents assigned a likelihood over
the threshold but also the likelihoods they do assign. This is one of the ways in which we can obtain
direct aggregators.
3.4 Direct aggregators
Let us consider again the median rule of [26]. We can define the median likelihood aggregator to gener-
alize the median rule.
Definition 3.5. Given a profile Pˆ, the median likelihood aggregator is defined as
M̂ED(Pˆ) = argmax
J∈J
∑
ϕ∈J
S(ϕ, Pˆ) , (15)
where
S(ϕ, Pˆ) = ∑
Jk∈Pˆ
akϕ (16)
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The median likelihood aggregator assigns to a given profile the classical judgment set that gives the
maximum sum of likelihoods assigned by all the agents to all the issues in it. E.g., the outcome using
M̂ED for the Example 1.1 profile is the crisp judgment set {s∨ t,h,x,¬e} with a “score” ∑ϕ∈J S(ϕ, Pˆ) of
16.8.
J
s∨ t x e h a ∑ϕ∈J S(ϕ, Pˆ) De(J, Pˆ)
0 0 0 0 1 13,2 11.00837576
0 0 1 0 0 7.2 13.98315881
0 1 0 0 1 15.4 13.09902931
0 1 1 0 1 9.4 9.935132833
1 0 0 1 1 14,6 10.45417943
1 0 1 0 0 8 13.7033258
1 0 1 1 0 8.6 13.48039101
1 1 0 1 1 16.8 8.91436323
1 1 1 1 1 10.8 12.38906945
Table 4: The set of all rational crisp judgment sets for the frame in Example 1.1, their “scores” and
Euclidean distance to the likelihood profile.
Recall that, for a crisp profile P, the median rule is defined as in Eq.(13). Proposition 3.2 is straight-
forward.
Proposition 3.2. MED(P) = M̂ED(P∗).
We now define three classes of direct aggregators.
Sequential direct aggregators. An intuitive way to define direct aggregators is to aggregate the judg-
ments issue-by-issue in a sequence by first “settling” the judgment on the issue for which the agents have
assigned the highest likelihood. To do this, we need to define what it means for a judgment to have “the
highest likelihood” in a profile. Several options exist and each of them leads to a different aggregator.
We consider only one here, in order to illustrate the process.
We define “the highest likelihood” to be the highest average likelihood assigned to a judgment in a
profile.
Definition 3.6 (Average likelihood). Given ϕ ∈Φ∪ and a profile Pˆ, the average likelihood for ϕ in Pˆ is
defined as
EPˆ(ϕ) =
1
n
n
∑
k=1
akϕ , (17)
Note that since, in general, we have likelihood judgments with inequalities, these average likelihoods
are actually average minimal likelihoods. Equivalently, we could have a vector of average maximal
likelihoods taking 1−a¬ϕ instead of aϕ for every ϕ . We could possibly consider linear weighted average
or any other opinion pooling function to define EPˆ(ϕ) in Eq.(17).
Let aPˆ be the vector of average likelihoods assigned to each ϕ ∈Φ∪ given a profile Pˆ. Namely
aPˆ = (EPˆ(ϕ))ϕ∈Φ∪ . (18)
The sequential average aggregator FˆS builds a crisp collective judgment set sequentially, adding first
as many as possible of the judgments with highest average likelihood then moving on to judgments with
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the next highest average likelihood and adding them only if they are consistent with the already added
judgments (skipping them otherwise).
E.g., for the profile in Table 3 we have the following:
aPˆ = (0.56,0.44,︸ ︷︷ ︸
s∨t
0.55,0.45,︸ ︷︷ ︸
h
0.75,0.25,︸ ︷︷ ︸
x
0.0,0.0,︸ ︷︷ ︸
a
1.0,0.0︸ ︷︷ ︸
e
).
We obtain FˆS(Pˆ) = {¬e,x,s∨ t,h,a}, with the judgments written in the order in which they were added.
If instead we had
aPˆ′ = (0.56,0.44,︸ ︷︷ ︸
s∨t
0.3,0.7,︸ ︷︷ ︸
h
0.75,0.25,︸ ︷︷ ︸
x
0.0,0.0,︸ ︷︷ ︸
a
1.0,0.0︸ ︷︷ ︸
e
)
for some profile Pˆ′, after adding {¬e,x,¬h} next we should have had to add s∨ t because its average
likelihood is 0.56. But since {¬e,x,¬h,s∨ t,a} is not consistent with Γ, we would obtain FˆS(Pˆ) =
{¬e,x,¬h,¬(s∨ t),a}.
For likelihood profiles P∗ corresponding to a crisp profile P, we have that
FˆS(P∗) = LEXIMAX(P) , (19)
where LEXIMAX is the non-probabilistic judgment aggregation rule defined in [30, 16]. We omit the
definition of LEXIMAX here due to space issues and the triviality of the proof of Eq.(19).
Many different functions can be defined using the average likelihood. The immediate approach
would be to build aggregators inspired by the class of scoring rules [6]. Furthermore, we can work with
not only the mean but also with max, min or otherwise polled individually assigned likelihoods.
Next we focus on the class of distance-based aggregation functions.
Distance-based aggregation Distance-based aggregators aggregate profiles by considering all possible
collective outcomes and choosing the one that is “most similar” to the profile at hand. Similarity is
defined by a distance measure - the greater the distance between two judgment sets, the less similar they
are. Distance from a profile to an outcome (judgment set) is defined as the sum or the maximum of the
distances between the outcome and each of the judgment sets to the profile. Thus, to define a direct
aggregator using the distance-based approach, we need to define a distance from a crisp judgment set
to a likelihood judgment set. To do this, recall that a crisp judgment can be seen as special case of a
likelihood judgment.
Given a distance function d (defined over vectors of reals) we can define a distance-based aggregation
function Fˆd as
Fˆd,Σ(Pˆ) = argmin
J∈J
∑ˆ
Jk∈Pˆ
d(J∗, Jˆk) , (20)
where the distance between two judgment sets is defined as:
d(Jˆ, Jˆk) = d((aϕ)ϕ∈Φ∪ ,(akϕ)ϕ∈Φ∪) . (21)
Alternatively instead of sum we can use max:
Fˆd,max(Pˆ) = argmin
J∈J
max
Jˆk∈Pˆ
d(J∗, Jˆk). (22)
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When we take d to be the Euclidean distance, (20) becomes
Fˆe,Σ(Pˆ) = argmin
J∈J
De(J, Pˆ), (23)
where
De(J, Pˆ) = ∑ˆ
Jk∈Pˆ
√
∑
ϕ∈Φ∪
(akϕ −aϕ)2. (24)
E.g., the outcome of applying the rule in Eq.(23) to the profile in the Example 1.1 is the crisp judg-
ment set {s∨ t,h,x,¬e,a} at a distance 9.17 from the profile, see Table 4.
Numerous statistical distance measures can be used, [4] offers variety of examples. Further research
is needed to establish what distance measure is a good choice.
In “classical” judgment aggregation, the distance-based aggregator, also known as the Kemeny rule
[26] is defined as follows. Let dH , the Hamming distance, between two crisp judgment sets J1 and J2
on the same crisp frame (Φ,N,Γ) be defined as the number of judgments on which J1 and J2 differ. For
example, for J1 = {p, p→ q,q} and J2 = {¬p, p→ q,¬q} we have dH(J1,J2) = 2. The Kemeny rule,
for a givenJ is defined as
FdH ,Σ(P) = argmin
J∈J
∑
Jk∈P
dH(J,Jk). (25)
We can however observe that the Euclidean distance is the same as the Hamming distance when the
likelihood judgment values are in {0,1} and thus we obtain that Proposition 3.3 holds.
Proposition 3.3. FdH ,Σ(P) = Fˆe,Σ(P∗).
If we use the L1 distance (namely, the sum of differences between absolute values issue-by-issue),
we obtain another generalization of the Hamming distance.
It is well known that for every crisp frame (Φ,N,Γ) it holds that med(P) = FdH ,Σ(P), see for example
[26] for a formal proof. This relationship does not extend to Fˆe,Σ and M̂ED. We give a counter example.
Consider the profile on Table 5. For this profile, Γˆ = > and Γ = >. All the rational judgment sets for
Φ= {p, p→ q,q}, Γˆ=> and Γ=> are given in Table 6. We have that M̂ED(Pˆ) = {p,¬(p→ q),¬q},
while Fˆe,Σ(Pˆ) = {p, p→ q,q}.
p ¬p p→ q ¬(p→ q) q ¬q
Jˆ1 0.0 0.3 0.8 0.1 0.6 0.2
Jˆ2 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.6
Jˆ3 0.8 0.0 0.1 0.8 0.3 0.7
Table 5: An example of a likelihood profile
The relationship between the distance-based aggregator and the median rule is broken when the L1
distance is used as well and a counter example is not difficult to be found. This is because the relationship
between the judgment on ϕ and the judgment on¬ϕ is broken - it is not always the case that the likelihood
of ϕ is a function of the likelihood of ¬ϕ .
Lastly we consider a new class of direct aggregators that are not reducible to “classical” JA aggrega-
tors.
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J
p p→ q q ∑ϕ∈J S(ϕ, Pˆ) De(J, Pˆ)
1 1 1 3.5 4.1818
1 0 0 3.5 3.8537
0 1 1 3.3 4.1064
0 1 0 3.6 4.0032
Table 6: The set of all rational crisp judgment sets for Φ = {p, p→ q,q}, Γˆ = > and Γ = >, their
“scores” and Euclidean distance to the likelihood profile from Table 5.
Most likely prime implicant One of the oldest and most studied aggregators in “classical” JA is the
so called premise-based procedure (PBP) [10]. Some aggregation problems are such that the agenda
can be naturally split into two sets: conclusions (or decisions) and premises (or reasons why a decision
is taken). For example, the agenda in the example in Table 1 can naturally be split into an agenda of
premises Φp = {p, p→ q} and an agenda of conclusions Φc = {q}. The PBP aggregator works in
two steps: first the majority is calculated for each issue in the premise agenda subset. In the example
in Table 1 this would yield the set of premises {p, p→ q}. Then the constraint is used to entail the
judgments on the issues in the conclusion agenda subset. In the example in Table 1 this would yield
the collective judgment set {p, p→ q,q}. PBP is an aggregator that has many good properties, but it is
only applicable to agendas that are split into premises and conclusions. Here we propose a likelihood
judgment aggregator that “operates” in the same way as PBP but it is applicable to any agenda.
When the agenda is split into premises and conclusions, the problem is such that the judgments on
the premises entail each of the judgments on the conclusions. From a logical perspective, the set of
premises is an implicant of the agenda. Let us formally define this concept generalizing it to any agenda.
Definition 3.7. Given an agenda Φ (not explicitly partitioned into premises and conclusions) and con-
straints Γ we say that the set I ⊆ Φ∪ is an implicant of Φ if I is a consistent (with respect to Γ) set and
either I∪Γ |= ϕ or I∪Γ |= ¬ϕ , for every ϕ ∈Φ∪ \ I. I is a prime implicant of Φ if I is an implicant and
there exists no smaller set I′ (I′ ⊂ I) that is also an implicant of Φ.
Consider the agenda and constraints of Example 1.1. This agenda has eight prime implicants, i.e., all
the consistent three-element subsets of {x,¬x,e,¬e,s∨ t,¬(s∨ t),a,¬a}.
We can define a class of irresolute likelihood aggregation functions based on agenda prime implicants
and a definition of most likely prime implicant. There are several ways a most likely prime implicant can
be defined. We give a few examples. Let I (Φ) be the set of all prime implicants of Φ. Then the most
likely prime implicant of Φ is the one with:
• the highest sum of average likelihoods
argmax
I∈I (Φ)
∑ϕ∈I EPˆ(ϕ)
• the highest minimum average likelihood,
argmax
I∈I (Φ)
minϕ∈I EPˆ(ϕ)
• the highest number of majority supported judgments,
argmax
I∈I (Φ)
∑ϕ∈I Nˆ(Pˆ,ϕ,c), etc.
Note that the three definitions given above determine three (possibly) different most likely prime impli-
cants for which we could use different names, but for simplicity we omit that.
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Once a most likely prime implicant I∗ is determined in one of the above described ways, the collective
judgment is a union of I∗ and the elements of Φ∪ implied by I∗.
Example 3.1. For the profile, agenda and constraints of Example 1.1, the prime implicant that has the
highest sum of average likelihoods is {s∨ t,x,¬e} yielding the collective outcome of {s∨ t,x,¬e,h,a}.
If the agenda and constraints are given in DNF (disjunctive normal form), the prime implicants can
be found in polynomial time [38]. To the best of our knowledge, prime implicants have not been used
to define aggregation functions in judgment aggregation, with the possible exception of [35] where a
distance based function for measuring dissimilarity between two classical judgment sets based on prime
implicants has been defined.
4 Properties of aggregators
Having generalized the classical judgment aggregation framework, the immediate question to consider is
whether the typical impossibility properties results also hold for aggregators of probabilistic judgments.
To establish this, we need to generalize the definitions of aggregation properties. We also need to see
whether there are new interesting desirable properties that need to be considered in the new framework.
We begin some of this work here.
We begin by exploring the “classical” impossibility theorem [5]. For this we need to define a resolute
likelihood aggregator. We then define the properties of universal domain, unanimity, rationality and
systematicity.
Definition 4.1. Let (Φ,N,Γ, Γˆ) be a probabilistic aggregation frame and let Pˆ be the set of all rational
likelihood profiles for it. A likelihood (resolute) aggregator R is a mapping R : Pˆ→J from the set of
rational likelihood profiles to the set of consistent and complete crisp judgment sets.
In other words, a (crispifying) aggregator is resolute if it assigns only one collective judgment set to
each profile.
Universal domain is the requirement that an aggregator R has to be defined for all the probabilistic
rational profiles (and all allowable crispifying vectors where applicable). Rationality is the property
that R produces only consistent and complete crisp judgment sets. These properties are embedded in the
Definition 4.1.
An aggregator R is dictatorial if there is an information source k ∈ N (a dictator) such that for each
likelihood profile Pˆ = (Jˆ1, . . . , Jˆn), the collective judgment is equal to the collective judgment on the
profile Pˆk = (Jˆk, . . . , Jˆk, . . . , Jˆk), i.e., only the judgment set of the dictator is considered in the aggregation
process. Non-dictatorship is the requirement that no information source is a dictator.
In “classical” judgment aggregation, unanimity is the property requiring that if a judgment is in
every judgment set in the profile it has to be in the collective judgment set as well. When aggregating
likelihood profiles, unanimity has to be defined with respect to some crispifying coefficient c, regardless
of whether R is a direct aggregator or not.
Definition 4.2 (Unanimity). Let c ∈ [0,1]. The aggregator R satisfies c-unanimity if for every profile
of rational probabilistic judgments Pˆ ∈ Pˆ, Pˆ = (Jˆ1, . . . , Jˆn), and every ϕ ∈ Φ∪ it holds that: if ∀k ∈ N:
akϕ ≥ c, then ϕ ∈ R(Pˆ).
Lastly we define systematicity. Intuitively, systematicity is satisfied if every two issues that are
judged as equally probable in two different profiles are treated equivalently by the aggregation rule R.
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Definition 4.3 (Systematicity). Given a profile Pˆ ∈ Pˆ, let us define Pˆϕ to be the projection of Pˆ on the
issue ϕ: Pˆϕ = (`(ϕ) ≥∗ akϕ | k ∈ N). The aggregator R satisfies systematicity, if for every two profiles
Pˆ, Pˆ′ ∈ Pˆ and issues ϕ,ψ ∈Φ∪, the following holds: Pˆϕ = Pˆ′ψ implies [ϕ ∈ R(Pˆ) iff ψ ∈ R(Pˆ′)].
The following theorem can easily be proved following the proof method of Theorem 3.7. in [19].
Theorem 4.1. Consider a frame (Φ,N,Γ, Γˆ). Let Pˆ be the set of all rational likelihood profiles that can be
defined for the given frame. The aggregation function R satisfies unanimity, rationality and systematicity
if and only if R is a dictatorial aggregation function.
For other desirable properties that could be applied in our framework we can look to the literature of
probabilistic opinion pooling [28, 8] for inspiration.
The systematicity requirement corresponds to a property called Strong setwise function property
(SSFP) in opinion pooling [28]. This property requires that the group probability of an event A depends
only on the individually assigned probabilities of A. It was shown that SSFP gives rise to impossibility
results in opinion pooling [28]. A weaker property, that is implied by SSFP, is the Zero Preservation
Property (ZPP). ZPP is satisfied when for profiles where all of the individually assigned probabilities
of an issue are zero, the collective probability of this issue is also zero. The ZPP property is related to
the unanimity property in “classical” JA. Here we can define ZPP as 1-unanimity, namely c-unanimity
where c = 1.
Intuitively, 1-unanimity is desirable: whenever every source is sure that an issue is true (or false),
a 1-unanimity satisfying aggregator will capture that certainty. However, unanimity on `(ϕ) = 1 for ϕ
does not mean that a rational judgment set J such that ϕ ∈ J exists! Recall that we have constraints Γ
imposed by the agenda setter on the outcome but not on the judgment sets of the profile. This means that
1-unanimity can only be satisfied in a specific aggregation frame if the set of constraints Γ of the frame
allows it. Let us give an example.
Example 4.1. Let (Φ,N,Γ, Γˆ) be a probabilistic aggregation frame such that ϕ1,ϕ2 ∈ Φ and {ϕ1 →
ϕ2} ∈ Γ. Let Pˆ be a consistent probabilistic profile in this frame such that `(ϕ1) = 1 and `(ϕ2) = 0 are
in every individual judgment set in Pˆ. Then 1-unanimity requires that {ϕ1,¬ϕ2} ⊆ J for every J ∈ R(Pˆ)
but none such J is inJ .
As seen in the above example, whether an aggregation function can satisfy 1-unanimity is a property
of the aggregation frame. We can define the ZPP property for likelihood aggregators R (the definition
also extends to irresolute direct and indirect aggregators as well) as 1-unanimity when the constraints
allow it.
Definition 4.4 (Zero preservation property). Let (Φ,N,Γ, Γˆ) be a probabilistic aggregation frame. Given
a profile Pˆ ∈ Pˆ, we define the set Z(Pˆ) as
Z(Pˆ) = {ϕ ∈Φ∪ : akϕ = 1, ∀k ∈ N}.
Namely, the set Z(Pˆ) contains all the agenda issues that have been unanimously awarded likelihood 1
in Pˆ. We say that an aggregator R satisfies the zero preservation property if for all Pˆ ∈ Pˆ it holds that if
Z(Pˆ) is consistent with Γ, then Z(Pˆ)⊆ R(Pˆ).
We consider one more intuitive property of probabilistic aggregators, that of convexity [28]. Con-
vexity states that the collectively assigned (minimal) probability on an issue should be a value no smaller
than the smallest and no higher than the highest individually assigned probability on that issue. For the
direct aggregators this property is not applicable, but it is so for the crispifying ones.
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Definition 4.5 (Convexity). Let Jˆ be one of the probabilistic judgment sets assigned to profile Pˆ by a
function Fˆ (before crispification). For a given ϕ ∈ Φ∪, let amaxϕ = maxk akϕ and aminϕ = mink akϕ . We say
that Fˆ satisfies convexity when for all collective Jˆ and every ϕ ∈Φ∪, if `(ϕ)≥∗ aϕ ∈ Jˆ then aminϕ ≤ aϕ ≤
amaxϕ .
It can directly be observed that fˆq(Pˆ) satisfies convexity and that Fˆq(Pˆ,c) satisfies ZPP and universal
domain. However Fˆq(Pˆ,c) does not satisfy rationality because the sets in Fˆq(Pˆ,c) are not always rational
sets of judgments.
The FˆS aggregator satisfies universal domain and non-dictatorship by design. It is clear that FˆS also
satisfies ZPP.
The distance-based direct aggregators satisfy universal domain and non-dictatorship by design, how-
ever it is safe to conjecture that they will not satisfy ZPP for the same reason that distance-based classical
aggregators do not satisfy unanimity [31] – for an agenda with sufficiently many issues, a judgment set
that does not contain the unanimously likely judgment might end up being “closer” to the profile.
With the most likely prime implicant class of aggregators, universal domain and rationality will be
satisfied by design. However, ZPP will not be satisfied - when the unanimously supported issue is not in
the prime implicant its inclusion in the collective judgment set will not be guaranteed.
5 Related work
As mentioned in the introduction, the area of probabilistic opinion pooling is concerned with aggregating
probability functions into a single one. As opposed to standard probabilistic opinion pooling, our logic-
based approach:
1. allows for an arbitrary agenda, namely instead of taking the entire σ -algebra, the agenda can be
limited to the important issues of consideration in the actual context;
2. We do not limit ourselves to expressing point probabilities over the issues (but we do include that
option as well);
3. The result of the opinion aggregation is a set of propositional statements, hence a final decision,
and not a probabilistic consensus.
Dietrich and List [8] generalize opinion pooling to general agendas and examine properties and impos-
sibility results. However, their work does not define any particular aggregators and also 2) and 3) are not
the case there.
The problem of transforming degrees of belief into binary beliefs is known as belief-binarization.
Dietrich and List [9] study how a profile of Boolean judgments, that has been transformed into a vector
of beliefs (for example a profile from Table 1 becomes the vector (23 ,
2
3 ,
1
3)) can be “binarized” into a
consistent set of Boolean judgments. In [9], however, only binary profiles are aggregated.
There are several approaches towards aggregating imprecise probabilities (IP), like aggregation of
probability intervals in [29], subjective opinion fusion in [22], etc. More recently [37] extended pooling
properties to IPs using convex functions. Moreover, they go further and aggregate precise probabilities
into imprecise (the convex hull of the input probabilities as a proof of concept) arguing that IP models
are better suited as models of rational consensus. Allowing for inequalities in the likelihood judgments,
we allow for modeling IP in the individual judgments. However, unlike [37] we require the collective
judgment to be crisp since our goal is to define specific aggregators that support the decision making in
various contexts.
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Dietrich and List [5] generalize classical JA assuming formulas from a general logic and prove
impossibility theorems. They show that the model is applicable to, for example, propositional, modal,
and many-valued logic. The model is not directly applicable to the likelihood logic we use here, since
it assumes that the agenda issues are formulas in the particular logic. Since it does not make sense
to choose a finite agenda of likelihood formulas, we express the issues in propositional logic and use
likelihood formulas for the judgments. The latter makes our framework fit better in the general theory of
aggregation of propositional attitudes in [7], that integrates probabilistic opinion pooling and judgment
aggregation. In this theory, profiles consist of attitude functions (which can be probability functions,
truth-value functions, etc.) defined over finite subset of a σ -algebra (an agenda). We believe that defining
notions on the level of a syntax has certain advantages, explicitly defining the concept of rationality being
one of them.
It is not always possible to have complete information, sometimes some sources will not be able to
provide information on all of the issues. Although impossibility results involving abstentions have been
shown [11], designing functions to aggregate the so called incomplete judgments is not given a lot of
attention in the JA literature [39, 34]. By showing how crisp profiles can be represented as likelihood
ones and designing likelihood judgment aggregators, we enable probabilistic judgment aggregation to
also be used for aggregating crisp incomplete judgment sets in a straightforward way.
Interpreting the likelihood operator with a possibility measure leads to the formula `(ϕ) ≥ a being
equivalent to the formula (ϕ,a) as well as the (uniform) crispifying being equivalent to α-cut in possibil-
ity theory. There are various methods of information fusion considered in this theory [12]. However, they
focus on merging information about the true state of a variable or a proposition and take a set theoretic
approach to defining the merging functions while we, on the other hand, follow the tradition of judgment
aggregation and social-choice theory and take an agenda of (logically related) issues as a starting point.
This means that both the (choice of) definitions of the aggregators, and the choice of crispifying coeffi-
cients depend on the agenda. Moreover, our goal is not just to merge the imprecise information coming
from the different sources, but to make a decision about the true state of the agenda issues.
Probabilistic belief merging is considered in [32, 33]. In belief merging sets of formulas, possibly
likelihood formulas, are called knowledge bases. Knowledge bases from several sources, that can be
mutually inconsistent, are merged to obtain a consistent knowledge base. The difference between belief
merging and judgment aggregation has been analyzed in [17]. Essentially, in belief merging the knowl-
edge bases do not share the same agenda, which entails different properties to be desired for the merging
operators as compared to the desired properties for judgment aggregation functions.
6 Conclusions and future work
We consider as the main contribution of our paper the definition of various functions for aggregating
likelihood judgments on logically related issues. Furthermore, we show how these aggregators relate to
classical judgment aggregation function, and in turn, through the results shown in [23] and [13], how
likelihood judgment aggregation relates to voting methods. We also define desirable properties for the
aggregation functions and show that the classical impossibility results hold here as well.
Some more consideration needs to be given to further distinguish the likelihood profile aggregators.
From the examples we can observe that very different outcomes are produced for the same profile by
different aggregators. The minimal set of properties we discuss is not sufficient to allow a user to choose
which is the best aggregator for a given probabilistic frame. In light of new properties, particularly the
direct aggregators need to be carefully studied.
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More properties from opinion pooling can be considered and “translated” into our extended JA frame-
work. An interesting candidate is the so called Independence Preservation (IP) property which intu-
itively requires that if two issues are probabilistically independent according to all information sources,
then this independence should be preserved in the collectively assigned probabilities for the two issues.
This has been explored by Wagner in [40] for the case of aggregating point probabilities over an agenda
of mutually exclusive events; [37] explores the imprecise probabilities case. Note that to represent proba-
bilistic independencies in the judgments, we need to either extend the logic of likelihood with polynomial
likelihood formulas or include likelihood independence formulas as defined in [21] directly in the lan-
guage. Then we could define IP properties alike [40] and [37] and see what are the consequencies of their
impossibility results in our platform. We notice also that the IP property is reminiscent of the agenda
separability property studied in [25]. One direction of future work is to establish this intuitive connection
and explore other such connections between probability aggregation properties and JA properties.
We believe that with this work we have made several contributions to the classical JA theory as
well: We have significantly extended the classical binary judgment aggregation framework, opening up
this social choice method for applications in new AI domains, particularly involving the aggregation of
uncertain judgments; our framework allows for not only uncertainties but also abstentions to be modelled
using `(ϕ) ≥ 0, which is a neglected feature in judgment aggregation frameworks overall; furthermore,
we generalize the assumption that the same relations between issues should hold for both the information
sources and the aggregated result. This “double constraint” framework is actually very intuitive [13].
Having a probabilistic framework also opens possibilities to study the truth-tracking properties of
judgment aggregators, namely how good is a function in aggregating profiles into the most likely judg-
ments. This area of judgment aggregation is still relatively little explored [3]. We intend to explore
truth-tracking in future work.
We believe that there is a possibility for applying our work to prediction markets [41], specifically
in extending the agenda of predictions (which is typically consisting of states of a random variable) to a
set of logically related statements. Prediction markets [1] are forums for trading contracts for outcomes
of future events. Each market participant possesses certain information about the event in question, and
conveys this information to the market by the way she trades contracts. The contract price is a result of
aggregation of the information possessed by all the participants, hence is an estimator of the probability
of the event in question. We believe we could seek for inspiration in defining new aggregators under our
platform by studying the methods of information fusion that various prediction markets apply.
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